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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this review was to examine the academic literature 
regarding self-exclusion as a form of harm minimisation in gambling and 
consider views from gambling operators and treatment providers. The extant 
literature was limited in that most studies were completed more than five ago; 
related specifically to a particular product or jurisdiction; relied on weak 
research designs and drew from self-selected samples. There were however 
some consistent findings indicating that in order to improve effectiveness, 
self-exclusion protocols should be: actively yet strategically promoted; quick 
and simple to implement; administered by attentive, well-trained staff; 
attracting sufficient investment in resources and technology to improve 
enforcement; and comprehensive rather than isolated in coverage (where 
feasible). Programmes should also be subject to robust evaluation and 
regulatory expectations should be detailed and specific rather than open to 
interpretation and general. Further scoping of the feasibility of multi-operator 
self-exclusion schemes (MOSES) was identified as a priority for future work.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Enabling gamblers to remove themselves from the gambling situation 
(operationally referred to as ‘voluntary self-exclusion’) is the most restrictive 
of harm minimisation measures. There is mixed support for the usefulness of 
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self-exclusion. Some suggest that it is an important component of a public 
health response to minimising gambling related-harm (Gainsbury, 2013), 
whereas others (Productivity Commission, 2010) identify it as a reactive, 
inflexible approach primarily facilitating abstinence rather than control.  
Our ability to control our behaviour is determined by our personal goals, 
our motivations, the feedback we receive about our behaviour and our ‘self-
regulatory resources’ (i.e., our reserves of ‘willpower’, and how quickly it 
becomes depleted) (Vohs, Baumeister, Ciarocco, 2005; Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Tice, 2008). Considered in these terms, self-exclusion has traditionally been 
the ‘last resort’ when other approaches to facilitate player control fail. 
Operators can help to facilitate self-control by providing timely behavioural 
feedback, limit-setting options, and restricting access to additional funds. 
However, if self-control still breaks down, operators can remove the need to 
rely on a player’s ‘self-regulatory resources’ by denying access to their 
gambling products. This option requires ceasing gambling altogether 
(depending on which gambling opportunities are covered in the agreement). 
However, restrictions on gambling access are now being used more creatively 
and more flexibly to promote responsible gambling to a wider range of 
gamblers (Griffiths, Wood, Parke, 2009). 
The form of self-exclusion agreements varies considerably according to 
product, operator, venue, sector, channel and jurisdiction. Key variations in 
form include whether: 
 
• provision and promotion is voluntary or mandatory; 
• agreements are enforced on a site-specific or operation-wide basis; 
• agreements are revocable; 
• duration of agreement is brief, long-lasting or permanent;  
• customers are removed from all promotion and mailing lists; 
• information regarding treatment and support is provided; 
• winnings may be confiscated in the event of a breach (e.g., 
disentitlement); 
• third parties can enact a self-exclusion agreement; 
• agreements only apply to certain products under certain conditions 
and; 
• agreements should be legally binding contracts with sanctions for 
breaches by either/both parties.  
 
The existing literature will only make a limited contribution to current 
academic, operational and regulatory challenges in Great Britain regarding 
self-exclusion for the following reasons: 
 
• The majority of the research studies were completed over five years 
ago. Gambling generally, and self-exclusion specifically, are 
influenced by changes in technology (e.g., more opportunities to 
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circumvent the agreement; more opportunities for sharing and 
managing central lists between operators).  
• Most studies focus on large, destination resort style casinos. 
• None of the studies draw their samples from gamblers in Great 
Britain. 
• Most studies consider agreements relating to land-based and not 
remote operations. 
• Most studies did not use a control group and consequently any impact 
cannot be causally attributed to the self-exclusion intervention (i.e., 
gamblers might have improved naturally even in the absence of 
undertaking self-exclusion). 
• Most studies used samples which were self-selected (i.e., the sample 
may not be representative of all self-excluders) and relied on self-
report data (inaccurate or biased recall).  
• Finally, it is not clear from the research what gambling alternatives 
were available. For example, greater accessibility to gambling (remote 
or land-based) will be likely to undermine a self-exclusion agreement 
with one venue or provider. 
 
The aim of this review is to provide a review of current understanding of 
the nature and effectiveness of self-exclusion as a form of harm minimisation 
in gambling. This article: 
 
1. Examines the academic literature regarding self-exclusion as harm 
minimisation in gambling; 
2. Considers views from two key stakeholders: gambling operators and 
treatment professionals who operate in Great Britain.  
 
This review will be useful for a broad range of stakeholders including 
industry, regulators, treatment professionals and researchers. This review 
extends to consider operational and regulatory issues through identifying 
priority areas for research and offering initial guidance on how existing 
research findings could be applied in operator-based approaches to self-
exclusion. While this review has been written with the British context in 
mind, we consider that most issues will have some relevance beyond Great 
Britain. 
 
2 METHOD 
 
Academic literature reviewed in this report was identified in three 
concurrent phases: a search of online electronic databases; grey literature 
accessed through web-based searches, personal knowledge and professional 
contacts; and through ‘snowballing‘, where references within other academic 
papers are pursued (Greenhalgh & Peacock, 2005).  
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Academic databases searched included: Academic Search Elite, Business 
Source Complete, PsychArticles, PsychInfo, Science Direct and Scopus. In 
addition, generalist web search engines (Google, and subsequently Google 
Scholar) were also used to identify relevant grey literature or technical reports 
not subject to traditional peer-review processes. Other relevant literature has 
also been considered using a similar approach where an appropriate link has 
been made with self-exclusion. 
While the theoretical basis for using self-exclusion as a form of harm 
minimisation is discussed in this report, the RGSB’s Self-Exclusion Working 
Group1 believed that it was also important to obtain a practical understanding 
of the operational issues from those working in the gambling industry and a 
better understanding of the clinical and practical issues from those working in 
treatment organisations. Views on these issues were expected to provide 
additional insight to supplement that provided in the academic literature.  
Throughout our review of the academic literature, examples of the 
qualitative responses from the stakeholder surveys are provided to support or 
contest the findings. These responses are not representative of the stakeholder 
group as a whole, rather they are the viewpoints of the individuals who chose 
to respond to the survey. However, they do provide a useful perspective and 
add useful context to the on-going debate around self-exclusion. Data in the 
dialogue boxes were derived from the Treatment Providers Survey and 
Operators Surveys. 
It is important at the outset to stress the limitations of the qualitative 
approach employed in both of these exploratory stakeholder surveys. Samples 
for both surveys are small, self-selected and are not necessarily representative 
of treatment providers or gambling operators generally. The purpose of these 
two exploratory surveys was not to provide ’evidence’ but rather to provide 
indicative perspectives through rich description and professional insight 
which may not have been recently captured elsewhere in relation to the British 
context. Due to constraints on time and budget, brief convenience samples 
were employed as a ‘first-step’ to better understanding the attitudes and 
concerns of these two stakeholder groups. For this reason, cautious 
consideration should be given to the qualitative data presented here, while 
acknowledging that the data are not necessarily representative of all gambling 
operators and treatment providers. Large scale representative surveys would 
be required if conclusions were to be drawn regarding proportions of 
responses from each stakeholder group, and  we do not currently consider that 
obtaining a reliable sense of such proportions is a priority for research in self-
exclusion. Frequencies of responses highlighted in the two tables which 
follow are indicative and are used primarily to summarise the open-ended 
responses in a concise and accessible way. 
1 The Responsible Gambling Strategy Board (RGSB) set up an expert working group 
called the Self-Exclusion Working Group (SEWG) in order to gather evidence and 
plan future work activity relating to self-exclusion. 
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2.1 Gambling operator perspectives 
 
Table 1 is a summary table of the themes of open-ended responses from a 
survey sent out to some of the largest gambling operators that serve residents 
in Great Britain. The open-ended format to the survey questions yielded 
qualitative data and these have been presented thematically in the main body 
of the report. It is worth reiterating that these findings are indicative and offer 
limited value from a quantitative perspective, given the small self-selected 
sample. For each question, responses have been grouped into themes, and the 
frequency with which these themes have been endorsed is then indicated by 
the number of asterisks (i.e., **** denotes four different operators making a 
similar point in their responses). 
 
Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
The availability of 
self-exclusion should 
be actively promoted 
in the venue or on the 
website. 
Yes, it should be actively 
promoted 
It should be 
easily accessible 
and clearly 
visible  
Encouraged, where 
appropriate, as a 
part of broader 
responsible 
gambling 
messaging  
  
*********** ********* ****   
Self-exclusion 
agreements should be 
irrevocable over the 
agreed time frame. 
Yes, with no exceptions  Revocable after 
6-12 months   
Revocable after 
interview with 
staff   
Yes, but with 
stricter interaction 
requirements 
****************** **** ** * 
No marketing should 
be permitted to 
customers during the 
self-exclusion period. 
Yes Yes, but some 
untargeted 
marketing (e.g., 
billboards, 
affiliate 
marketing) is 
hard to control  
Yes, but there will 
be mistakes at 
times 
 
***** ***** ***** ***** 
** 
** *   
Referrals should be 
made to third party 
organisations that can 
offer support, 
information and 
treatment for 
excluders where 
appropriate. 
Yes, they are given 
information (not a direct 
referral by staff)  
No, this should 
be the customer’s 
choice 
Third party support 
may not be 
appropriate but 
information is 
given if requested  
GambleAware™ 
details should also 
be given 
***** ***** ***** ***** 
*** 
* * * 
Up-to-date training on 
managing the self-
exclusion process 
should be provided to 
the appropriate staff. 
Yes Yes, all staff get 
self-exclusion 
training 
Yes, all customer-
facing staff 
Senior managers 
or dedicated 
teams get in-depth 
training 
************* ****** ***** ** 
The customer's 
account should be 
locked upon initiating 
Yes Not relevant 
(e.g., land-based) 
Access is given to 
allow funds to be 
withdrawn 
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Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
any exclusion 
agreement and any 
available funds are 
paid out to the 
customer. 
******************* *** *   
Options should be 
provided to customers 
to exclude by different 
types of gambling 
offered by the same 
operator. 
No blanket approach 
favoured to offer 'complete 
protection' from harm 
Yes Too difficult or 
resource intensive 
(usually land-
based) 
May only be 
suitable to some 
customers 
  *********** ********* **** * 
Options should be 
provided to customers 
to exclude across 
remote and land-
based operations of 
the same operator 
(where applicable). 
Yes Not Applicable If customer 
requests 
(extending to 
different channels 
should not be 
automatic)  
Difficult 
enforcing from 
remote to shop 
  ********* ****** **** ** 
Options should be 
provided to exclude 
across multiple 
operators (remote or 
land-based)? 
Supportive but considered 
not currently feasible  
Yes, but also 
given the option 
to close just one 
account  
Yes Each operator 
should be 
responsible for 
managing their 
own player 
exclusions 
******************* ** ** * 
Options should be 
made available for 
considering third 
party self-exclusion 
(i.e., a request made 
by a concerned 
significant other). 
Taken into consideration 
but no direct action 
Too many 
challenges (legal 
and data 
protection in 
particular)  
Do not agree Yes 
************ ***** ***** *** 
The effectiveness of 
self-exclusion 
programmes should 
be evaluated on a 
regular basis. 
Yes Yes, but difficult 
to measure  
We do not 
currently do this 
 
  ******************* ***** **   
Penalties should be 
imposed on the 
customer in the case 
of a breach. 
No, not feasible/too 
difficult to enforce 
No, unfair to 
customer 
Yes Winnings should 
be confiscated 
********* ***** ***** **** 
Penalties should be 
imposed on the 
operator in the case of 
a breach. 
No Yes, if operator 
wilfully 
disregards 
agreement (e.g., 
knowingly 
accepts excluded 
players) 
Unfair as 
appropriate 
technology is not 
available  
Already exists in 
licensing 
conditions 
  ******** ***** **** *** 
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Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
The minimum 
duration for a self-
exclusion agreement 
should be six months. 
Yes Optimum period 
is unknown 
Shorter, more 
flexible durations 
should also be 
offered 
At least one year 
  **************** *** *** *** 
The minimum 
duration for a self-
exclusion agreement 
should be flexible and 
defined by the player. 
Minimum six months but 
over six months should be 
flexible 
No Yes More flexibility 
would place 
greater pressure 
on resources 
  ******* ****** ***** *** 
Should players be 
reinstated 
automatically at the 
end of the term of the 
exclusion period or 
should the operator 
engage with the player 
to gauge 
appropriateness of a 
return before any 
reinstatement? 
Staff-customer interaction 
should be required first  
(e.g., 'positive action' letter 
confirming they no longer 
have a problem; an 
interview with staff) 
Automatic 
reinstatement  
but play (e.g. 
limits) and 
marketing should 
be controlled  
Automatic 
reinstatement 
An objective 
assessment of 
vulnerability 
should made 
before reinstating 
*************** **** *** ** 
Following 
reinstatement, should 
players be monitored 
by the operator, to 
assess ongoing risk or 
vulnerability? If yes, 
how should this be 
done? 
Monitor risky play (using 
behavioural analytics or 
staff monitoring) 
Yes Responsible 
gambling tools 
suggested or 
mandated 
Ongoing 
monitoring is not 
feasible 
  *********** ***** ***** *** 
Should a request for 
self-exclusion take 
immediate effect, or 
should there be a 24-
hour cooling off 
period? Does it 
depend on product or 
channel? 
Self-exclusion should take 
immediate effect 
There should be 
a 24-hour 
cooling-off 
period 
There should be 
staff/customer 
interaction to 
explain the process 
to ensure the 
customer 
understand what is 
involved 
   *************** ******* *   
Should players have 
the option to request 
self-exclusion without 
having to interact with 
customer services or 
come into the venue 
(land-based)? 
Yes No, customer 
service 
interaction is 
useful for 
determining real 
reason for 
excluding 
No, the customer 
needs to fully 
understand what 
the agreement 
entails 
No, presenting 
valid 
identification is 
required 
  ************* ****** ***** ** 
If you have any other 
comments in relation 
to self-exclusion in 
Great Britain, please 
include these here: 
Additional themes included: 
 
1. Self-exclusion is only part of the answer                                                                  
“The clue is in the title, ‘self’.  Self-exclusion cannot be effective for someone who does 
not want to comply, it can help those who genuinely want help.  It is a step for an 
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Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
individual who is recognising they have a problem, it cannot be the solution for an 
addict. It’s very hard to develop an effective nationwide scheme because it needs so 
many other parties to take part (e.g. ,banks) and other trade parties AGCs etc. However, 
we should always try and improve what we do.”        
                   
“The key word to me has always been ‘self’. Strategies should be developed on the belief 
that we are working to support customers who genuinely wish to control their gambling 
and not restricted on the basis of what may go wrong with the other occupational 
excluders or chancers.”                                                                                                                           
 
“It cannot be helpful to problem gamblers to present exclusion as a complete solution.  
It is simply never going to be that and it should not, in our view, be presented as a way 
to ensure someone never gambles again and a solution to their problem.” 
 
“As above, we believe the SE system has merit but is not the sole solution.  Equally, it is 
not accurate to say all self-exclusions represent those with pathological or serious 
gambling problems.   We place equal merit on working with customers to limit their play 
or visits, believing it can be better to play in a location where they are known and 
supported, rather than exclude them so they then go somewhere else where they are not 
so protected.”  
 
2. Industry sharing of experiences  
“An industry funded website or forum may have merits for individuals to share 
experiences and fears and promote suggestions as to how they could have been helped 
more under the particular set of circumstances that they encountered.” 
  
Notes: Some operators made more than one point and some made no points or did not have sufficient explanation 
to warrant inclusion; so frequencies do not necessarily total to 26 responses for each question. Some categories 
are not mutually exclusive but arranged in the most descriptive and useful way to represent subtle differences in 
responses. 
 
 
A large majority of gambling operators responding to the survey 
supported the following principles of best practice in self-exclusion: 
 
• agreements should be irrevocable; 
• marketing should not be permitted during the self-exclusion period; 
• Information on third party support and treatment should be provided; 
• all staff involved in self-exclusion should have regular, up-to-date 
training; 
• options should be provided to exclude across multiple operators 
(provided barriers can be overcome); 
• provision should be evaluated on a regular basis; 
• penalties to either operator or customer were inadequate for 
improving enforcement; 
• reinstating access following the end of an agreement should not be 
automatic but should involve either initial interaction with staff or 
ongoing monitoring of account to assess risk; 
• requests to exclude should take immediate effect. 
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There was limited consensus between operators regarding the following 
principles: 
 
• options should be provided to customers to exclude by different 
product; 
• exactly how information from third parties might be used in the self-
exclusion process; 
• appropriate duration of a ban and the substantive difference between 
cooling-off breaks and self-exclusion; 
• players being able to enact self-exclusion without interacting with 
staff or coming into the venue (so that there is mutual understanding 
between parties regarding player motivations and implications of the 
agreement); 
• whilst all operators agreed that self-exclusion should be accessible, 
there was less certainty regarding what ‘active promotion’ necessarily 
entailed. 
 
2.2 Treatment provider perspectives  
 
A range of treatment organisations were approached and invited to 
participate in a survey designed to improve understanding regarding treatment 
providers’ attitudes and views on clients’ experiences of self-exclusion.2 It 
should be noted that clients currently receiving support and/or treatment for 
their gambling will not necessarily be representative of all players who decide 
to self-exclude. A summary of the open-ended questions and responses 
grouped by theme and response frequency is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Response Summaries for Treatment Providers Survey 
Question Categories 
Overall to 
what extent 
has self-
exclusion been 
effective in 
assisting 
people to 
address their 
gambling 
dependency or 
to help them 
control their 
gambling? 
Land-based 
less 
effective 
(e.g., no 
membershi
p scheme 
or 
monitoring; 
staff happy 
to reinstate; 
limited 
options on 
lottery 
products) 
Multi-
operator 
exclusio
n needed 
– self-
exclusio
n 
agreeme
nts are 
too easy 
to 
circumve
nt 
Certain 
sectors 
more 
vigilant 
than others 
(limited 
specificity) 
Too 
much 
advertisi
ng and 
marketi
ng 
material 
More 
effective to 
use a filter 
(e.g., 
Gamblock) 
Ineffecti
ve – 
duration 
not long 
enough 
Self-
exclusio
n 
difficult 
when 
gamblin
g is an 
integral 
part of 
clients’ 
social 
landscap
e 
More 
successfu
l when 
used in 
conjuncti
on with 
treatment 
and other 
support 
  *********
******** 
******* ****** **** **** *** ** ** 
2 This survey was designed and administered by the Self-Exclusion Working Group 
and the National Clinicians Network Forum. 
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Table 2: Response Summaries for Treatment Providers Survey 
What, in your 
experience, 
have been the 
reasons clients 
have not taken 
up the 
opportunity to 
self-exclude? 
Able to 
gamble 
elsewhere 
Not 
ready to 
stop 
gambling 
Shame and 
embarrass
ment 
Lack of 
trust in 
the 
system 
Inconvenienc
e, cost or 
effort of self-
exclusion 
      
****** ***** **** *** ***     
What, in your 
experience, 
have been the 
reasons why 
clients have 
continued or 
returned to 
gambling 
during the 
time a self-
exclusion 
agreement has 
been in force? 
Not ready 
to quit 
Can 
gamble 
elsewher
e 
Agreement
s not 
rigorously 
enforced 
or policed 
To test 
the 
system 
Pressure of 
advertising 
No 
addition
al 
support 
in place 
Peer 
pressure/ 
no  
alternati
ve 
activities 
in place 
Responsi
bility for 
enforcem
ent 
unclear 
****** **** *** *** *** *** ** ** 
If, in your 
knowledge, 
family or 
friends of the 
gambler have 
been assisted 
or supported 
by him/her 
being subject 
to a self-
exclusion 
agreement 
please list their 
comments in 
this box.  
There 
should be 
more 
information 
on its 
availability 
It’s a 
positive 
step/sho
ws 
commit
ment 
Needs to 
be better 
enforced 
Feel 
they are 
policing 
the 
gambler 
Allows them 
to trust the 
gambler 
again 
   
**** ** ** * *   
In your 
opinion, as a 
treatment 
provider, how 
could self-
exclusion be 
improved to 
enhance player 
protection 
measures? 
Better 
enforcemen
t (use 
technology, 
penalties 
for breach) 
Staff 
training 
should 
be 
improve
d 
Should be 
multi-
operator 
More 
promoti
on and 
informat
ion 
provisio
n 
Should be 
immediate/di
screet 
No 
advertis
ing 
should 
be 
allowed 
during 
exclusio
n period 
Should 
be 
linked to 
treatmen
t (e.g., 
reinstate
d only 
on 
professi
onal 
advice) 
Tailored 
exclusion 
should be 
allowed, 
rather 
than 
blanket 
bans 
*********
* 
****** **** **** **** *** ** ** 
Notes: Some treatment providers made more than one point and some made no points or did not have 
sufficient explanation to warrant inclusion; categories are not mutually exclusive but arranged in the most 
descriptive and useful way to represent subtle differences in responses. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND STAKEHOLDER 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
3.1 Promoting self-exclusion 
 
Simplicity and convenience are key guiding principles underpinning 
successful self-exclusion (Gainsbury, 2013; Nowatzki & Williams, 2002; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2008; Williams, West & Simpson, 2013). 
However, the active promotion of self-exclusion varies considerably across 
operators, sectors and jurisdictions.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Low levels of uptake 
 
Although records of self-exclusion engagement are not systematically 
kept by all treatment providers, an example given indicates that only a small 
minority of those in treatment have engaged with self-exclusion prior to 
seeking help. 
 
“Anecdotally, the proportion of clients who approach the service for 
counselling who have self-excluded from betting shops or casinos 
before contact with us is in the region of 5-15%. This figure is based 
on assessment notes where it may have been mentioned by the client, 
either as a successful initial method or otherwise.” 
 
Simplicity is important 
 
The limited capabilities of a problem gambler was also identified as 
an important reason for having a simple and convenient registration 
process: 
 
“Only 40% of them actually wanted to go through the process of self-
excluding as they have to go into each outlet they were trying to avoid 
and ban themselves from each filling in a form/including photos. 
Obviously to go into that environment without gambling is nigh on 
impossible due to the stimuli that would be in there for them. Not to 
mention spending what money they have on getting passport photos 
done. This process also requires forward planning and organisation; 
generally speaking when someone is in the midst of a gambling 
problem they can’t do either.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Staff contact or not? 
 
Most operators supported the notion that a player should be able to 
enact an agreement without having to interact with customer services 
staff: 
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“…shame, guilt, fear etc are a common features among addicts or 
players who believe that they might develop an unhealthy attitude 
towards their gambling therefore giving them the option to self-
exclude without interaction is advisable because forcing them to 
interact with customer services first might put an extra threshold they 
might not overcome.” 
 
“We believe it can be very difficult and shameful for players to admit 
that they have lost control over their gambling. We do not see any 
reasons, why the industry should aim to artificially make this 
threshold any higher than necessary. We believe the best way to file 
self-exclusion is a clear and unambiguous web interface that fully 
informs the player of all consequences his decision will have. After 
filing this form, the player should receive a written confirmation of his 
request that signposts relevant counselling offers. We however agree 
that the player should not be forced to use one specific medium. Self-
exclusion requests should be accepted via all channels, which can 
assure the identity of the requestor.” 
 
However, some operators disagreed and suggested that staff-customer 
interactions are important in determining that exclusion is right for 
them, that the customer is who they say they are, and that they 
understand what they are committing to:  
 
“…the implications of the exclusion need to be clear, the 
documentation completed correctly and a photograph provided.  […] 
this can be done in shop or via telephone contact with our designated 
exclusion line. To do otherwise creates unmanageable situations for 
operators and, ultimately means that exclusions are not properly 
implemented.” 
 
“We would say ‘no’ otherwise the customer may not have the 
opportunity to fully discuss self-exclusion with a member of staff in 
order to understand what the agreement entails, whether or not it is 
right for them and what the implications are of entering into one. We 
do agree however, that a customer should be able to renew their 
annual self-exclusion agreement without the need to re-enter the 
betting premises (ie by calling a dedicated Customer Care number).” 
 
According to the literature, operator-based promotion of self-exclusion in 
various jurisdictions is considered to be comparatively weak. In one study in 
Australia, for example, despite the mandatory promotion of self-exclusion 
programmes, only 10% of venues were identified as visibly promoting their 
programmes (Interchurch Gambling Taskforce, 2000). In a South Australian 
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sample of self-excluders, it was reported that only 11% were prompted by 
staff, and of the 17% who had independently approached staff to request 
possible options for managing their problem, only half were given 
information about self-exclusion (Hing & Nuske, 2012). Similarly, in a 
German sample, only 39% reported any previous awareness of the option to 
self-exclude prior to seeking help on their own initiative (Hayer & Meyer, 
2011a). Rate of uptake of self-exclusion options among problem gamblers is 
considered to be very low. Estimates range between 0.4% and 3.5% of 
problem gamblers in land-based venues (Nowatzki & Williams, 2003; O’Neil 
et al., 2003; SACES, 2003).  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Active promotion is important 
 
Current promotion and levels of awareness were considered to be 
inadequate among some treatment organisations: 
“A more pro-active approach from gambling venues when recognising 
problematic gamblers, staff could approach these clients and talk to them 
about self-exclusion and other support available (more staff training may help 
to support this) My understanding is that this is supposed to happen now 
however very few of my clients have disclosed having experience of this.” 
“I think it is imperative to make everyone aware of the tools and strategies 
involved with self-exclusion and often family/friends will be very supportive 
of this step being taken but have often been sceptical on how it works and if it 
works.” 
 
Views here were generally critical of operator role in promoting and 
facilitating self-exclusion. 
 
“Clients express concern of ‘walking in there’, being tempted and 
losing control.” 
 
“Several clients reported being ‘talked out’ of self-exclusion by the 
bookie.” 
 
“The client who self-excluded from an adult gaming centre had quite a 
challenging experience. There were a number of barriers that had to be 
overcome, i.e., the establishment had no accessible literature. Self-
exclusion was not promoted within the organisation i.e., posters 
displayed. We challenged two establishments requesting their policies 
and procedures on self-exclusion.” 
 
It was suggested that the following should be done: 
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“Large notices on display to offer self-exclusion as a support to 
problematic gambling. More information could be made visible to 
clients in gambling venues about self-exclusion.” 
“Help for problem gambling should be offered to staff. Helpline 
numbers should be more visible.” 
“Making online self-exclusion options easier to find and choose.” 
“Having easily identified links – on gambling sites – to sites where 
self-exclusion is explained.” 
“Periodic written reminders to individuals to confirm their self-
exclusion timescales.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Requirement to define ‘active 
promotion’ 
 
Operators’ comments point to a need for a clearer definition of what 
is meant by ‘active promotion’ of self-exclusion, specifying the 
difference between accessibility and promotion: 
 
“We believe self-exclusion should be available to all customers. 
Whether it should be ‘actively promoted’ is a question of definition.” 
“It should be clearly available and simple to access so people in need 
can utilise it without any difficulty.”  
 
“Not actively promoted but available in all venues and all staff aware 
of the self-exclusion process.” 
 
Enacting self-exclusion and cooling-off 
While there was no coverage of this issue in the academic literature, 
responses from both surveys suggest that requests to self-exclude should take 
immediate effect.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Requests should take immediate effect 
 
“Venues should not be able to offer 24 hours cooling off period – we all 
tend to change our mind after a night’s sleep – if a person has experienced 
problems with gambling that should be taken seriously immediately, before 
someone with a gambling problem goes back to chasing in the forlorn hope to 
win his losses back.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Requests should take immediate 
effect 
The majority of operators suggested that requests to enact a self-
exclusion agreement should be implemented immediately: 
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“In the case of self-exclusion we are dealing with a potential addict. 
We fail to see why we would artificially delay the acceptance of a 
self-exclusion request, knowing that the player has a very high risk of 
relapse. We believe self-exclusion should be implemented at the first 
possible point in time after the player's request. Delays should only be 
acceptable in case the request was ambiguous (e.g., player not 
mentioning whether the self-exclusion should be temporary or 
indefinite).” 
 
Barriers to uptake 
 
Nowatski and Williams (2002) suggest that in practice, the self-exclusion 
process requires an investment of time and potential embarrassment, both of 
which may act as disincentives to uptake. Disincentives are considered in 
more detail below. 
The general requirement for self-exclusion to be simple and convenient is 
arguably most relevant to the implementation process once the gambler has 
made the decision to take action. A variety of options for activation, such as 
via the internet, by telephone or in person, should be made available 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). Technology may drive evolution in this 
regard, drawing on other media promoting convenience such as mobile 
phones and apps. In addition to variety in channels, consideration might also 
be given to extending activation points beyond operations to potentially 
including relevant third parties such as treatment providers or the regulator 
(Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). 
Requirements to enact a self-exclusion agreement in person (or through 
phoning customer services in the case of remote gambling) may cause 
embarrassment, thereby acting as a disincentive (Productivity Commission, 
2010). This may be due to the potential stigma of help-seeking behaviour. 
Individuals suffering more generally from psychological or psychiatric 
distress, even if severe, often do not seek help (Bebbington, Meltzer, Brugha, 
Farrell, Jenkins, Ceresa, & Lewis, 2000). Specifically, only around 10 to 15% 
of problem gamblers ever seek help (Cunningham, 2005; Slutske, 2006; 
Volberg, Nysse-Carris, & Gerstein, 2006; Productivity Commission, 1999; 
Ministry of Health, 2007; Suurvali, Hodgins, Toneatto, & Cunningham, 
2008).  
Finally, if a gambler has taken steps to stop gambling, and has 
demonstrated impaired control in the gambling environment, then it may be 
counter-productive to require them to visit the gambling venue. Hing and 
Nuske (2012) found that self-excluding in the gambling venue put the 
individual in a position of necessary further exposure to gambling. This may 
also apply to remote gambling where the gambler is required to visit the 
website to enact. 
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Reinstatement 
 
Reinstatement, i.e. re-entering into a self-exclusion agreement at the end 
of its original term, should be made possible from various points of access, 
thus removing the need to visit the venue and face potential temptation to 
gamble (Hing & Nuske, 2012; Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). It has 
also been recommended that the restrictions should only be lifted after some 
form of ‘positive action’ (i.e., a request to return to the casino) rather than 
permitting access automatically at the end of the exclusion period 
(Responsible Gambling Council, 2008).  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Positive action 
 
The need for such positive action was consistent with some views from 
treatment providers:  
“In Australia a person has to apply in writing to a venue to be allowed 
back after the self-exclusion period has expired.  Canberra Casino would 
insist that a gambling counsellor would write a recommendation that it would 
be okay to do so, since they were concerned that responsible gambling could 
be sustainable.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Access should not be automatic 
The most common response by operators was that there should be 
some form of engagement prior to reinstating a customer and 
terminating an exclusion agreement: 
 
“Our approach is that there should be some engagement.   We do not 
believe an automatic reinstatement (i.e., without even asking) is 
appropriate, although we do not feel it necessarily requires a full 
discussion if it is the first such request and there are no mitigating 
factors.  However, for any contentious request (e.g., something of 
concern written on the request form) and/or a second or third request, 
we would always want and expect a conversation and would make a 
decision based on what we believe is best (which can and does 
sometimes result in a refusal).” 
 
Some operators suggested that reinstatement should be accompanied 
by additional controls or restrictions: 
 
“In our opinion any account that is reinstated should be fitted with a 
loss limit. Therefore the account should not be reinstated 
automatically. Before being reinstated the player needs to ask for it in 
writing (email) and should then get an email highlighting the info 
available on responsible gaming and asking them to make a 
suggestion for a daily, weekly or monthly loss limit (or all at the same 
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time). The responsible gaming department has to assess the account 
prior to receiving an answer from the customer and has to have a clear 
number of max loss at hand before the customer comes back with his 
or her answer. If the customer comes back with a higher figure then 
the responsible gaming department cannot set the limit higher as 
previously determined internally (or leave the account closed as the 
case may be). If limit suggested by customer is lower than what has 
been determined internally then usually the customer gets the limit he 
asked for (in any case never higher than suggested by the customer).”  
“What I would suggest would be that the account is automatically 
reopened after the termination of the self-exclusion period, but no 
marketing material should be sent to the customer stating that the 
exclusion is over.  The customer still has to log in in order to play. 
Then it is up to the customer to choose whether or not the customer 
should play on the account.  If the operator engages with the customer 
after the self-exclusion period has passed, this may result in enticing a 
player who might not want to play.” 
 
Detection and enforcement of self-exclusion 
 
In research exploring casino-based self-exclusions in other jurisdictions, 
evidence suggests that at least 50% continue to gamble either with the same 
provider or elsewhere (DeBruin, 2001; Ladouceur, Jacques, Giroux, Ferland, 
& Leblond, 2000; Ly, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010) and that 33–77% of breaches 
go undetected by staff (Croucher et al., 2006; Schellinck & Schrans, 2004). 
Nelson and colleagues (2010), in their Missouri casino-based study, followed 
up with 113 self-excluders reporting that only 25% ceased gambling 
completely. Of that sample, 16% had reported breaching their agreement with 
the originating casino. 
Evidence also suggests that the probability of a breach increases 
considerably over the duration of an individual’s agreement (Ladouceur, 
Sylvain, & Gosselin, 2007; Ly 2010). In Tasmania, for example, only one 
person from a sample of 40 self-excluders reported gambling during the first 
three months, however over half of the sample eventually did breach before 
the end of their agreement (Ly, 2010).   
Disincentives for breaching self-exclusion 
Ly (2010, p.57) identified that a key disincentive to breaching self-
exclusion agreements was embarrassment, with patrons suggesting that they 
“just couldn’t go”.  However, the impact of potentially being embarrassed 
may be moderated by perceived responsibility for maintaining that agreement 
(with embarrassment potentially being lower where they reject responsibility). 
Even where consumers are made aware of their rights and responsibilities 
under a self-exclusion agreement, many still believe it is the responsibility of 
the operator to ban them from accessing and participating in gambling 
activities (Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). 
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Treatment Professionals Survey – Client disincentives for breaches 
 
“… the sense of shame they state they would feel if they were refused 
entry to a venue that they have excluded themselves from are often intrinsic as 
to how effective the self-exclusion will be for a client.” 
One treatment provider provided a list of reasons for clients attempting to 
breach: 
 
“Underlying personal difficulties which keep re-emerging; Using 
gambling as a coping strategy; Strong attachment to gambling due to 
past use; Gambling is easily accessible on high street and online; 
Exposure to advertisements; Unable to replace gambling with other 
activities.” 
 
Penalising the self-excluder may act as a disincentive to breaching their 
agreement. However, financial penalties may be unworkable, as this would 
suggest that the problem gambler has control over their gambling, which not 
usually the case (Napolitano, 2003; Faregh & Leth-Steenson, 2009). Nowatzki 
and Williams (2002) warn against the use of a financial penalty given the 
deleterious impact it would be likely to have on a problem gambler’s 
economic situation.  
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Customer penalties inappropriate 
Operators were not supportive of penalising the customer as a 
disincentive. 
“…gambling addiction is a disease with an ‘unreasonable’ urge to 
gamble, penalties would not deter and would not serve anything in our 
opinion.” 
The most common response was that penalising customers would not 
be feasible and would be too difficult to manage: 
“To be able to enforce, self-exclusion could no longer be a ‘voluntary’ 
agreement with the added emphasis being on the customer to comply. 
It is difficult to see how penalties would benefit either party and 
would be impractical to manage – especially with the legal 
consequences of each case.” 
 
While imposing financial penalties may not be feasible, an alternative 
disincentive may be to withhold any winnings where gamblers are in breach 
of their self-exclusion agreement.  This is done in various US states (Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey; Ladell & Smith, 2011). The primary 
disincentive for the problem gambler in this instance is to remove the 
motivation to chase losses. While evidence suggests that the long-term 
motivation of problem gamblers is not financial (Binde, 2013; Stewart & 
Zack, 2008), the opportunity to gamble and win money is still a critical 
component of impaired control, given its relationship to excessive loss-
69 
THE JOURNAL OF GAMBLING BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
2014, 8 3 
 
chasing behaviour. The British Columbia Lottery Corporation found some 
support for this claim from stakeholder interviews following their 
implementation of a disentitlement policy (Ladell & Smith, 2011) in addition 
to suggestions that reduced excitement may also deter breaches.  
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Withholding winnings as a 
disincentive 
Some operators suggested that disentitlement may be the most 
appropriate disincentive: 
“As all bets are voided and all funds returned the penalty for the 
player is they cannot receive winnings on accounts opened after an 
exclusion…” 
“What penalties are envisaged?  The customer, if found on the 
premises, certainly should not be able to retain any of his winnings.” 
Some operators outline that these issues are not straightforward even 
if the aim is laudable.  
“We feel this [penalties] is difficult. By means of self-exclusion, the 
customer states that he might be experiencing relevant gambling-
related problems, potentially ranging up to a mental disorder. We are 
unsure whether such a player would be responsible for his behaviour, 
when trying to circumvent a self-exclusion. However, we agree that 
trying to circumvent self-exclusion provisions should be 
disincentivised.” 
“There are an increasing number of cases where people try to claim 
back losses on the pretence of having a gambling problem (and, of 
course, sometimes when they legitimately do) and the issue of liability 
for a SE breach is a difficult one.  As an industry, we do not believe 
that operators should be liable for repayment if a SE customer does 
not keep their side of the agreement by staying away.   We would not 
expect them to return winnings accrued during a breach.   The threat 
of imposing ‘penalties’ depends on what is intended, but the idea of 
threatening prosecution for trespass has been used and is not a bad 
idea if it helps keep them away and protect against claims if they do 
get in.   Even then, whether such penalties could realistically be 
enforced in practice is another matter, but they can serve as a 
deterrent.” 
 
One option would be to void all potential winnings by self-excluders who 
had gained access to gambling opportunities. 
It has been suggested that the operator may allocate forfeited winnings to 
support research, treatment and education in problem gambling, which would 
ensure there is no misunderstanding regarding the aims and objectives of the 
initiative (Productivity Commission, 2010).  
However, the extent to which this approach would be legally enforceable 
is questionable. Napolitano (2003) suggests that, in some jurisdictions where 
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such arrangements are in place, these ultimately have not proved legally 
permissible. However, the legal framework may have shifted over the last 
decade. 
In some jurisdictions (e.g., Tasmania, Ly, 2010) breaches incur fines for 
the operator, a practice that has been advocated by some experts (Nowatzki & 
Williams, 2002) to incentivise improved enforcement efforts among 
operators. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, 
computerised ID checks are required for casino entry and the level of recorded 
breaches is significantly reduced if not eradicated as result (Nowatski & 
Williams, 2002).  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Operator penalties could improve 
commitment 
 
There was some support for operator penalties among clinicians, with 
some stating that enforcement would be more effective: 
[in response to a question on potential improvements] “If a penalty was 
introduced to gambling establishments who do not effectively uphold the self-
exclusion agreement by allowing self-excluded clients to continue gambling 
in their establishments.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Operator penalties for wilful 
disregard of agreements 
Some operators suggest that this might be appropriate for wilful 
disregard of self-exclusion agreements: 
“Depends on the nature of the breach” 
“Depending on the breach of the self-exclusion, penalties should be 
imposed if the operator removed a person's self-exclusion despite the 
agreement being a certain time frame.”  
“In the case of negligence or knowingly breaching, then yes: breach 
would need to be defined carefully.” 
“Penalties should apply, but only in the case of negligence by the 
operator. More relevant however, all losses of a self-excluder who 
managed to gain access to gambling opportunities should be voided 
(parallel to voiding all winnings in q 14).” 
 
Other operators point out that penalties, although not necessarily 
automatic nor systematic, may already be applied by the regulator: 
“SE must be a two way agreement with both sides making best efforts 
to meet their side of the arrangement.    An operator should be 
expected to make best efforts and are required by the LCCP to do so.   
Any potential for ‘penalties’ is therefore down to the Commission in 
terms of whether the operator is realistically meeting its obligations.  
However, that would be for wholesale breaches.  For the odd 
individual breach, the operator should not be liable provided they take 
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action to address any weakness in their systems that might have 
contributed.” 
 
Improving detection 
 
Ly (2010) makes the following suggestions for the improvement of 
detection accuracy in self-exclusion: 
 
• requiring self-excluders to provide both a profile and a camera-facing 
photograph for each agreement and requiring staff to spend time 
looking at the photos at the start of every shift; 
• electronic (such as a driver’s licence or player card) rather than paper-
based systems could enable operators to effectively check patrons 
against a database of self-excluders;  
• an electronic identification system may also have the added benefit of 
enabling venues to detect minors, identify other unwelcome patrons, 
and to assist player tracking and data management.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Detection and enforcement need 
improvement 
There was a general sense among clinicians that enforcement was 
poor in most locations. 
Some concerns were expressed that some gambling industry staff 
wilfully disregarded self-exclusion agreements:  
“A client reported that he had self-excluded and went in anyway, 
which prompted the person at the counter to reinstate him (since my 
client ‘obviously wanted to gamble again’).” 
An area that was identified as being weak on enforcement was retail 
outlets selling lottery tickets and scratch cards:  
“The most difficult area to self-exclude from was issues around 
lotteries and scratch cards due to the volume of opportunity to gamble 
on these and the lack of recognition that such activities could cause, 
particularly by shop owners and small retailers.”  
“It is very difficult to effectively self-exclude from lottery retail 
outlets due to the sheer volume of different premises offering this 
provision.” 
Self-exclusion was reported as most effective when the gambler 
attended one venue in particular: 
“Clients find self-exclusion most effective, when they gamble alone or 
in a specific gambling place; such as a betting shop.”  
“Clients who find self-exclusion more successful are generally those 
that use only one or two betting shops habitually.” 
“Self-exclusion in betting shops seems to work if it is the client’s 
regular betting shop but excluding from all in one company in a given 
area seems to be less effective according to feedback.” 
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The use of technology was raised as a potentially important strategy for 
improving enforcing and detection: 
“Gambling establishments should have digital photos that should be 
circulated throughout all branches.” 
“Modern technology to be used nationwide to make the process more 
effective and easier to deploy.” 
Introduce mandatory electronic membership cards to enable gambling, 
which would be disabled or taken away from self-excluded gamblers. 
 
3.2 Impact of self-exclusion 
 
There currently exists a void of robust evaluation studies which can offer 
any meaningful insight into the impact of self-exclusion in minimising 
gambling-related harm (Gainsbury, 2013; Nowatzki & Williams, 2002; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). Evaluation of impact should explore 
‘effectiveness’ (impact on gambling-related harm) and ‘efficiency’ (required 
resources being used optimally to minimise harm) rather than just promotion 
and take-up as the only indicators of success. 
In terms of effectiveness, numerous studies across a variety of 
jurisdictions have reported reductions in problem gambling (Hayer & Meyer, 
2011a; Ladouceur & colleagues, 2000, 2007; Nelson et al., 2010; Tremblay et 
al., 2008). There has also been support that such positive impacts are 
enduring, with impact still noted at follow-up periods up to ten years later 
(Nelson et al., 2010; Hayer & Meyer, 2011a). Improvements in well-being 
(Hayer & Meyer, 2011a; Ladouceur et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2010), control 
over gambling (Ladouceur et al., 2007), and social and familial functioning 
(Ladouceur et al., 2007; Tremblay et al., 2008) have also been reported. No 
studies to date have examined efficiency in provision. 
Treatment Providers Survey – Assistance for significant others 
Some clinicians identified that the self-exclusion process provided 
additional support for those significant others in the gambler’s social support 
network: 
“Most of the partners felt that it was a positive step and showed their 
partner was willing to do something to correct their behaviours.”  
“Where family support is available, feedback has suggested that family 
members feel the gambler has made a higher level of commitment to change.” 
“This enables the family/friends to begin to trust in the gambler again.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Evaluation not an easy task 
Some operators make the point that evaluating impact is not 
straightforward: 
 “In-house we evaluate how well we monitor and spot related accounts 
but how does the industry measure whether self-exclusion is helping 
people with gambling issues or just utilised as a method of account 
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closure and the people with gambling issues just close their accounts 
in the normal way.” 
“We agree [that evaluation should be done] — although it is difficult 
to necessarily assess how effective they have been.  We assess and 
compare the number of exclusions each year, but remain unclear 
whether more is good or bad as there are various mitigating factors. 
For example, is more a result of an increase in problem gamblers or 
better awareness through information being provided?  How do we 
know whether someone who excluded has benefited if we don't see 
them again?  Has it helped their problem or have they simply gone to 
gamble elsewhere?  It is difficult for operators to contact SE 
customers and ask ‘how is it going?’ as this could be misconstrued or 
have the wrong effect.” 
“By what measures is an operator supposed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a self-exclusion programme?  If the person never 
comes back? If he comes back after his self-exclusion and is a model 
customer? “  
 
3.3 Who self-excludes? 
 
Research examining land-based self-exclusion suggests that there is a 
particular demographic profile for the typical land-based self-excluder. Self-
excluders are predominantly male, middle-aged, married or cohabiting, and 
the vast majority are problem gamblers (De Bruin et al., 2001; Haefeli, 2002; 
Ladouceur et al., 2000; Ladouceur et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2010; Steinberg 
& Velardo, 2002). Gender differences are also reported, with female self-
excluders more likely to be older, be divorced, separated or widowed, have 
shorter gambling careers and to prefer games determined by chance (Nower & 
Blaszczynski, 2006). In remote gambling settings, the profile tends to vary 
somewhat, with excluders being more likely to be single (Hayer & Mayer, 
2011) and younger (Dragcevic et al., 2013; Hayer & Mayer, 2011; Wardle, 
2012). 
While the earlier empirical evidence offers some support for the claim that 
it is predominantly problem gamblers who request exclusion agreements 
(Ladouceur et al., 2000; Steinberg & Verlado, 2002; Blaszczynski & Nower, 
2004), more recent European studies focussing on samples from remote 
operations have shown that self-exclusion agreements are used by players 
from across the full spectrum of gambling participation (Griffiths et al., 2009; 
Hayer & Meyer, 2011; Wardle, 2012) with as few as 10% of excluders in one 
study doing so to manage gambling-related harm (Griffiths et al., 2009). 
Griffiths et al. also reported that less than 1% of their remote gambling sample 
used self-exclusion to attempt a permanent cessation of gambling. However, it 
is unclear whether these differences in motivation reflect changes over time, 
differences across jurisdiction, differences between remote and land-based 
operations or a combination of these factors. 
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In a series of innovative studies using player data captured from a remote 
gambling operator, Shaffer and colleagues identified a series of behavioural 
markers indicative of whether a gambler eventually self-excludes, including 
higher staking levels, higher levels of net expenditure, greater variability in 
betting and greater frequency of play (Braverman & Shaffer, 2012; LaBrie & 
Shaffer, 2011; Xuan & Shaffer, 2009). In another study, also drawing on 
behavioural data, this time from a different remote operator, Dragcevic et al. 
(2013) reported that self-excluders were more likely to have a higher net 
expenditure and to play casino games.  
Multi-Operator Self-Exclusion Schemes (MOSES) 
A fundamental criticism of existing self-exclusion arrangements, in 
relation to both land-based and remote gambling, is the relative ease with 
which most consumers can continue to gamble at other venues, sites, 
operators, sectors or jurisdictions. This situation not only undermines the 
potential impact of self-exclusion to problem gamblers but also penalises 
more responsible operators. Consequently, there exists an imperative to 
explore and develop a ‘collective’ option where data and resources can be 
shared, so that gamblers can have the choice of a more comprehensive reach 
when they take the decision to self-exclude.  
An important consideration, particularly in the context of land-based 
operations, is that outcomes should justify the resources that would be 
required to support them. For example, it may not be a prudent use of 
resources to develop a system permitting a consumer enacting a self-exclusion 
agreement in the south of England, to expect an exclusion request to be 
successfully enforced in a venue of the same operator in the north of Scotland. 
The likelihood of such a system being necessary to minimise harm would be 
extremely low, and the resources required to support it would be extremely 
high. This focus on efficiency is not about protecting industry profits, but 
about ensuring that resources dedicated to harm minimisation are used in an 
optimal way.  
Regarding options in the remote sector, technological developments can 
drive self-exclusion to evolve through the creation and maintenance of an 
anonymous and secure ‘register’ (Dragicevic, 2011; Francis, Dragicevic & 
Parke, 2012). Such technology could give gamblers the option to restrict 
access beyond the original site to other operators participating in the scheme.    
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Multi-operator self-exclusion is 
important 
The need for multi-operator self-exclusion schemes was endorsed. 
Allowing the customer to choose between all or only a selection of 
venues and sites was considered to be important. 
 “The one comment that occurs on a regular basis is the need for 
global self-exclusion or a national database that works with all online 
companies, to stop clients going from one to another with ease.” 
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There were also some examples of where this was being tried and 
developed: 
“There is an organisation already in existence called ‘count me out’ 
www.countmeout.org.uk,  they have a service that allows a person to 
self-exclude without having to enter a gambling establishment to do it 
and a database set up covering several areas. It has 126 industry 
members showing on the website who are connected to it at the 
moment. Currently it is utilised mainly with casinos/ arcades etc., 
however if the main companies also signed up this could be useful.”  
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Multi-operator self-exclusion is 
important but presents challenges 
 
The vast majority of responses identify that this is an important but 
challenging objective. 
An interesting point regarding resources was made, in that focussing 
on a specific region across all operators will be more effective than 
focussing on all regions across just one operator. 
 
“We agree and are working on this with other land-based operators.   
There is an argument that a total exclusion across a local area (all 
types of gambling) is more valid than across multiple operators of the 
same product, but who may not be represented in the same town.  
However, anything that allows a customer to easily extend their 
request (without having to make it multiple times) is desirable. Online 
is more difficult, due to the vast number of sites, but the UK point of 
consumption licensing might bring this closer to reality.  Again, as 
long as the customer has the choice it makes sense.   They must have 
that choice in order to overcome the data protection issues of 
otherwise sharing their information with other sites without their 
consent.” 
 
“A national database that operators can access would be a great 
introduction. Locality needs looking into, automatic boundaries inside 
which exclusion from all operators take place.” 
 
Only one of the 26 participating operators suggested that each 
operator should be responsible for managing their own player 
exclusions. 
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Table 3: Challenges and Potential Solutions for Implementing Collective Self-
Exclusion in the Remote Gambling Sector (S. Dragicevic, personal communication, 
September 18, 2011; Francis et al., 2012) 
Industry 
Concerns 
Response 
Technical 
integration 
*A small number of data fields are required to share amongst operators which 
are available from every operator making operator integration very simple 
*In addition operators can manually upload CSV files to the system, which 
means that operators can start sharing relevant data without any technology 
integration 
System 
development 
and 
maintenance 
cost 
*In the case of VeriPlay3 established cloud technologies are used, it is quickly 
and easily scaled to on-board additional operators.  The cost of storage, central 
processing units and network bandwidth has exponentially decreased since the 
1980s e.g., the cost per terabyte of storage from Apple in 1980 was $14 million, 
today it is $70 (Barracuda). Therefore this is not an issue 
*Additional industry and regulatory requirements can also be quickly and cost 
effectively added to the system to ensure it can evolve at the pace that industry 
innovation changes to meet operator requirements e.g., supporting self-
exclusion across different gaming verticals 
*Arguably more expensive self-exclusion systems (e.g. facial recognition 
technology) have already been adopted in some global jurisdictions e.g., 
Canada. 
Data 
privacy 
*Secure encryption algorithms ensures data always remains anonymous except 
for the operators sending and receiving the data i.e., ensuring a player’s 
anonymity by separating a player’s identity from the player’s account data.  This 
can be achieved through a number of proven statistical and mathematical 
methods, including data reduction, data perturbation and data hashing methods 
*Therefore data stored in this encrypted format is meaningless to the operator of 
the self-exclusion service (VeriPlay) and is arguably more secure than when 
stored in the gambling operator’s own data centre 
*There is a precedent for sharing data as operators today share anonymised 
player data for non-commercial reasons e.g., European Sports Security 
Association (ESSA) to ensure integrity in online sports betting, bwin and 
Harvard Medical School’s collaboration into problem gambling research 
Conflicting 
national 
laws 
*Not a valid reason, as it makes sense to adopt schemes at a national level as it 
is likely one would need to be a citizen of a regulated jurisdiction to gamble, 
which is what many jurisdictions are now actively implementing e.g., the 
Danish regulator is taking a step towards such a scheme with ROFUS (problem 
gambling register) 
Service 
abuse 
*Independent audits could enforce the integrity of a scheme. However, it is 
highly unlikely that established and regulated operators would risk their 
reputations by abusing such a scheme. If required, penalties could also be 
defined by the industry and/or regulators to ensure service abuse does not exist 
Driving 
customers to 
unregulated 
*Ensuring customers gamble with responsible, regulated operators is a broader 
regulatory issue that the EU and the industry need to work together to tackle and 
is not an excuse for not implementing such a service which could go a long way 
3 Veriplay is a proprietary self-exclusion solution – see www.veriplay.org  
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Table 3: Challenges and Potential Solutions for Implementing Collective Self-
Exclusion in the Remote Gambling Sector (S. Dragicevic, personal communication, 
September 18, 2011; Francis et al., 2012) 
operators in protecting vulnerable gamblers 
Independent 
service 
management 
*The service could be governed collaboratively with relevant industry 
organizations or could be technically managed on behalf of a regulator or 
problem gambling treatment provider. The service could also easily be hosted 
on a regulator or other server if required 
 
Operational challenges 
 
Table 3 summarises the potential challenges that have been identified by 
the industry, and responses/resolutions to these challenges (S. Dragicevic, 
personal communication, September 18, 2011; Francis et al., 2012). Concerns 
include prohibitive costs, concerns over data privacy, integration challenges 
with various IT infrastructures, the potential for service abuse, driving 
customers to unregulated markets, and the need for independent service 
management. Dragicevic and colleagues believe some of the challenges can 
be overcome through effective policy and process design and through the use 
of secure technologies that are currently used to protect player data in 
regulated markets.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Governance Options for Collective Self-Exclusion  (Francis et al., 2012) 
 Scoring Criteria D r i  
 
D r i  
 
r i v  
 
r  B   
Fu
nc
tio
na
l S
co
pe
 P
ot
en
tia
l 
Multi- Channel Support Can the approach support multi-
operator self-exclusion across multiple gaming channels 
e.g., retail, internet, mobile, etc? 
5 5 5 2 
Integrate Future Requirements Is the approach flexible and 
extendable to integrate future industry developments and 
functional requirements e.g., managing self-exclusion by 
gaming vertical across operators? 
4 6 3 2 
Multiple-Access Points Can the approach support multiple 
integration approaches, such as access to a central list via a 
technology integration (e.g., web API), human access to a 
list via a portal, etc? 
6 6 6 1 
Supports Problem Gambling Research Does the approach 
lend itself to support future academic research into problem 
gambling, for example via access to anonymised player 
data on problem gamblers on a central list? 
6 5 2 2 
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Table 4: Governance Options for Collective Self-Exclusion  (Francis et al., 2012) 
Total 21 22 16 7 
A
do
pt
io
n 
Po
te
nt
ia
l 
Mandatory Operator Adoption Can the approach achieve 
mandatory adoption from gambling operators in a 
jurisdiction? 
6 4 2 1 
Low Marketing Effort Does the approach require minimal 
marketing effort to raise sufficient awareness amongst all 
consumers? 
6 3 1 2 
Low Cost to Player Does the approach require minimal 
time and cost to consumer to use? 6 6 3 1 
Low Cost to Operator Does the approach require the 
minimal operator investment in developing and/or 
integrating to the solution or service? 
3 2 4 5 
Total 21 15 10 9 
Notes: scored 0-6 with 6 being positive 
 
3.4 Delivery and governance options 
 
Francis et al. (2012) assessed the potential options for the delivery and 
governance of a collective self-exclusion solution and categorised these into 
four categories of system: a ‘regulator-driven system’ whereby operators 
would be mandated to generate, manage and use a collective list (e.g., Danish 
regulatory approach); an ‘operator-driven system’ overseen by an industry 
collaboration in the absence of mandatory regulatory requirements; a ‘player-
driven system’ where players voluntarily add their names to the list and 
gambling operators can engage on their own terms (e.g., Aristotle and 
PlayerVerify); and a final option involving ‘computer blocking software’ 
which is purchased, downloaded and blocks access to gambling sites (e.g., 
Gamblock).  
Francis et al. carried out a subjective assessment of the potential effectiveness 
of approaches according to two dimensions they developed, including 
‘Functional Scope Potential’ and ‘Player Adoption Potential’. This assessment 
is summarised in Table 4. Francis et al. concluded that the preferred 
governance solution would either be regulator-led with significant industry 
involvement, or operator-led with regulator endorsement. The player-driven 
and software blocking approaches were considered inferior due to significant 
limitations as identified in the table. However, if ‘simplicity’ and ‘barriers to 
implementation’ were considered as part of the assessment, then a player-
driven system may also carry weight, particularly if it initiates a process 
which eventually leads to a more robust approach in due course. 
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3.5 Optimal duration of agreement 
 
Duration of exclusion agreements varies considerably from a matter of 
hours in some remote operations (Griffiths, Wood, & Parke, 2009) to lifetime 
bans in some US states (e.g., Missouri; Nower & Blaszczynski, 2008). 
However, there is currently no academic consensus on the optimum length of 
exclusion for promoting harm minimisation and well-being. Nowatzki and 
Williams (2002) advocate an irrevocable five-year contract and there is 
evidence that longer terms are preferred by gamblers (Ly, 2010; Steinberg & 
Velardo, 2002). There has also been evidence that longer bans result in lower 
and more stable visiting frequencies following the ban (De Bruin et al., 2001). 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Preference for six-month minimum 
length 
The most common response was that a six-month minimum term was 
currently employed (not necessarily that it was most appropriate) and 
this probably reflects licensing conditions. 
Some operators suggested that shorter more flexible arrangements 
were not in the best interest of the player: 
“I don’t agree with this [flexible options for shorter ban length], the 
player has a ‘gambling problem’ and there should be some period of 
time within which it is feasible that behaviour can change, if it is 
controlled by the player they could request a week and what difference 
in reality can a week make to a behavioural problem such as 
compulsive gambling.” 
It was suggested, depending on the sector and whether remote or 
land-based, this may not be the best use of resources for harm 
minimisation: 
“LBO-wise, it is far too difficult for staff to manage multiple ending 
agreements where there is no membership entry system. Across all 
other brands it would be abused too, purely as customers would not 
associate the seriousness of entering into a self-exclusion agreement 
with say a period of 48 hours. It would be utilised more as a method of 
‘taking a break’ as opposed to a long term commitment to control 
gambling spend, for which it was originally intended.” 
 
Conversely, some suggest that retaining flexibility through using shorter 
bans with the option to review or terminate may be most effective 
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2004; Griffiths, et al., 2009; Productivity 
Commission, 2010) and that short-term options should be available as long-
term or permanent bans may deter uptake (Productivity Commission, 2010). 
In the sample of internet gamblers, Griffiths et al. (2009) found 10% used the 
self-exclusion facility to take a ‘temporary’ break for a period of time. The 
most preferred exclusion term identified was a week-long term, endorsed by 
46% of the sample.  
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Flexibility in duration of agreement may promote self-control for those 
preferring not to abstain, and may also increase uptake and the range of 
gamblers willing to consider it as an option for staying in control. Although 
self-exclusion has traditionally been considered one of the final options for 
consumers failing to regulate their gambling behaviour (Williams et al., 
2012), with increasing evidence that problem gambling is not necessarily a 
chronic condition (Delfabbro, 2013; Reith & Dobbie, 2012) the impact of 
shorter, more flexible exclusion arrangements merits further research. 
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Longer duration is preferable 
The general feeling was that there should be a longer minimum ban 
length than 6-12 months:  
“Minimum exclusion period in Australia tends to be 12 months; I 
don’t think that six months are long enough.” 
“Venues only appear to offer the minimum six-month period rather 
than inform about options.” 
 
3.6 Links to treatment 
 
In some jurisdictions, self-exclusion agreements are linked with treatment, 
either by referring self-excluders to sources of help, by mandating attendance 
at treatment sessions prior to reinstatement, or by offering ongoing treatment 
and support as an integral part of the self-exclusion agreement (Ladouceur et 
al., 2000, 2007; Nowatzki & Williams, 2002). There is mixed support for 
whether operators should play a more active role. While there is some support 
that self-excluders would value signposting (O’Neil, 2003; Responsible 
Gambling Council, 2008), other evidence suggests that taking the step to 
exclude was sufficient for managing their gambling (Ladouceur et al., 2007). 
Further, Ladouceur et al. found that the majority of self-excluders were 
unreceptive to the notion of therapeutic support, with 49% considering it but 
only 10% eventually accessing it.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Treatment is the best solution 
“I think it would be very difficult if not impossible to implement a 
self-exclusion system which would be effective in the way we/society 
want it to be. This, in my view, is because of the nature of the human 
mind when it is in a state of ambivalence. Our actions can suggest we 
desire to stop doing something when our psychological desire is still 
to do it. We are often not ready to change things as change can mean 
loss and anxiety. Further, taking preventative measures may simply be 
a means of appeasing others.  However, there is still a measure of 
protection or minimisation of harm that self-exclusion offers and the 
use of it may contain an already unwieldy problem for the client.  In 
that respect, offering self-exclusion that is linked somehow to getting 
real help/treatment would be a better way to administer it.” 
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Gambling Operators Survey – ‘Inform’ rather than ‘refer’ 
regarding treatment 
The overwhelming majority of operators reported that while they do 
not make direct referral for various reasons (data protection, lack of 
clinical expertise), they do provide sign-posting information regarding 
various relevant resources: 
“We have information on where customers can obtain help but it is not 
appropriate for staff who are not medically or psychiatrically trained 
to be making referrals.  It is also impractical in a 24-hour gaming 
business as this would require a team of appropriately trained people 
to be employed round the clock for the occasional person who 
requires such assistance.  The cost would massively outweigh the 
advantages.” 
“This is not done within our organisation unless we have agreement 
with the person who self-excluded, due to the Data Protection Act. We 
do however provide customers who request exclusion due to gambling 
problems and/or addiction, local information of where help can be 
obtained.” 
 
Beyond the notion of sign-posting, it is not clear whether operator-based 
self-exclusion should carry with it the requirement to seek some form of 
treatment. Most forms of talking therapies have been shown only to benefit 
those who are receptive and motivated (Arean & Miranda, 1996; Cooper et 
al., 2003). For this reason, mandatory counselling is not likely to be effective, 
and may actually act as a deterrent to entering into a self-exclusion 
arrangement (Nowatzki & Williams, 2002; Ladouceur et al., 2007; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). Ly (2010) suggested that an 
alternative option may be to nominate a sponsor known to the individual to 
provide social support during the process, which could work better than a 
helpline providing support from strangers. Ly suggests that this may also help 
with potential boredom and social support during exclusion. 
Third-party exclusion requests 
Some operations in some jurisdictions have explored ‘third-party’ 
exclusions whereby a significant other can request an exclusion be enacted to 
protect the welfare of the problem gambler (Thompson, 2001).  However, this 
approach would require that the significant other can correctly identify that 
such an intervention is needed, which is a questionable assumption. It has 
been shown that, while often motivated by an intrinsic desire to solve their 
gambling problems, 23% of self-excluders are persuaded by others to 
negotiate a self-exclusion agreement (Nelson et al., 2010). Also, such an 
approach opens up the possibility of abuse and would be likely to invoke a 
significant administrative burden. Nowatski and Williams (2002) concluded 
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in their review that this approach has been employed with only limited 
success. 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Consideration rather than automatic 
action 
Operators generally identify that this approach is fraught with issues 
and may not be reliable for reasons already captured above. Some 
operators suggest that this information may still be used even if it does 
directly trigger the exclusion: 
“It has to be done in a manner not to go against the Data Protection 
Act.  If a third party contacts the company because they are worried 
that a person is playing too much or having a problem, the customer 
service agent will disclose that no information can be given about the 
account holder due to the Data Protection Act.  Nonetheless, customer 
service asks the third party to send the request in writing with the third 
party's ID.  This is then escalated to legal and responsible gaming in 
order to determine the best course of action, for example, contacting 
the customer proactively after a day to discuss his/her gambling.” 
“We agree that often indication by third parties had been helpful to 
identify potential problem gamblers. However indication by third 
parties has also been extremely misleading in some cases (we have 
even seen requests for third-party exclusion as harassment in ongoing 
divorce disputes). We therefore do not believe that naively accepting 
third-party exclusion requests would be reasonable (or constitutional). 
We have however introduced a process that allows intervention by 
third parties, while maintaining the rights of the player: 
1) Information by third party is accepted, third party is informed that 
due to privacy regulation we cannot confirm whether the person is our 
customer;  
2) Third party is however informed that we will investigate the case 
and approach the person, in case he is our customer; third party is 
asked whether they want to remain anonymous or whether they want 
to be mentioned, when we confront the player;3) If the person is our 
customer, we investigate the case, confront the player and demand 
explanation; and 4) If no or no sufficient explanation is provided, we 
take the right to impose exclusion on the player; this exclusion is 
however our decision based on our risk-management and our house 
right. It is not the direct consequence of the third-party request.” 
“…third-party concern can be listened to and interaction with that 
customer can then happen, but the process should always be player 
and operator driven together.” 
“We always consider third-party concerns, follow up and interact with 
the customer and ensure action is taken if appropriate.” 
“These options are available within our Policy.   It usually requires the 
individual to be spoken to first – as it is not unknown for a 
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‘concerned’ third party to be out of step with the reality and/or acting 
in their own self-interests or prejudices.    However, we reserve the 
right to enact an ‘enforced exclusion’ if it transpires that the third-
party claim is correct but the individual does not accept it.” 
 
3.7 Self-exclusion by product  
 
One of the most controversial issues debated in gambling studies is 
whether different products have a variable potential to cause harm. There are 
various perspectives on this point: 
 
• variations in the form of gambling have little relevance over the form 
of gambling-related harm (LaPlante, et al., 2009; Griffiths & Auer, 
2012; Blaszczynski, 2013);  
• availability rather than form of gambling is more important (Abbott, 
Francis, Dowling,  & Coull, 2011); 
• the form of gambling is an important determinant of gambling-related 
harm (Orford, Griffiths, & Wardle, 2012; Parke & Griffiths, 2007). 
 
Preferences to limit exclusions to certain products may also be determined 
by individual (e.g., personality, motivation and preferences) and 
environmental (location, medium, accessibility) variables. However, there are 
currently no directly relevant studies examining this issue, and therefore 
research which explores player perspectives on harm minimisation strategy is 
required, of which the potential value of self-exclusion according to product 
should be a primary focus. 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – No consensus on exclusion by 
product 
Operators were split on this with half of respondents suggesting that 
such flexibility is important and the other half suggesting that half-
measures would undermine a player’s attempt to minimise harm, and 
therefore they would seek to require a blanket ban across all products. 
“Based on the syndrome model of addiction, this could be a dangerous 
thing to do. While a customer might be encountering only problems 
with slot machines today, he might be encountering problems with 
other types of games after having ‘excluded from slots’ (=addiction 
hopping). Self-exclusion in its original meaning should therefore 
always aim to affect all types of games offered.” 
“Distinguishing between soft and hard gambling is very dangerous, a 
self-exclusion should be from all forms of gambling.” 
Some operators suggested some products were identified for exclusion 
more frequently than other forms: 
“…very rarely do customers require sports gambling to be removed, 
it’s almost always casino and slots.”  
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Observations were also made that this was easier in a remote setting: 
“Online this is easily achievable but, in retail, the exclusion has to be 
from the shop.  It would be almost impossible for the shop team for it 
to be otherwise.” 
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Preference for flexibility in focus of 
ban 
One provider stated that this is becoming more acceptable: 
 
“The face of gambling has changed dramatically over the last few years 
and so has the face of the problematic gambler, so being able to exclude from 
forms of gambling they wish to exclude from or have identified are more of a 
risk to them would be very helpful”. 
 
3.8 Staff training and corporate culture 
 
Research from gambling jurisdictions suggests that whilst venue staff 
appear confident of protocol when customers actively seek information, there 
is often ambiguity regarding procedure and responsibility when staff observe 
customers clearly experiencing distress (Delfabbro, Borgas, & King, 2012; 
Hing & Nuske, 2011a; Hing & Nuske, 2011b; McCain, Tsai, & Bellino, 
2009).  Evidence suggests that part of the uncertainty of staff in engaging in 
customer intervention is uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of the process, 
and to what extent such intervention is perceived as a valued action by 
corporate management (Hing, 2007; Hing & Nuske, 2011a). Research clearly 
indicates that employees are in favour of further training in customer 
interaction in order to have clarification regarding procedures and 
responsibilities (Giroux, Boutin, Ladouceur, Lachance & Dufour, 2008; Hing, 
2007), and the Productivity Commission (2009) countenanced the case for all 
employees on the gaming floor to have such intervention training. 
Ultimately, evidence suggests that staff who underwent responsible 
gambling training to provide problem gambling and referral information, not 
only felt more confident and empowered to respond proactively to distressed 
customers, but were also more likely to intervene (Giroux et al., 2008; 
Ladouceur, Boutin, Doucet, Dumont, Provencher, Giroux et al., 2004).  
However, it is argued that management must more actively monitor customer 
intervention from floor staff, or online customer service staff, in terms of 
rewarding staff for effective interventions and potentially disciplining staff 
who did not respond appropriately in this respect (Kranacher, 2006; McCain 
et al., 2009).  Although it may not be feasible to evaluate with any accuracy 
the validity or effectiveness of staff judgements and actions regarding 
customer interactions, the underlying proposition was to create mechanisms to 
demonstrate corporate support and commitment towards proactively 
providing problem gambling and referral information.  Research clearly 
demonstrates that employees’ perception of the ethical climate, via genuine 
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managerial support, strongly influences whether they implement responsible 
gambling practices or not (Boo & Koh, 2001; McCain et al., 2009; Peterson, 
2002). 
Given the inherent challenges in proactively intervening and providing at-
risk customers with problem gambling and referral information, it is argued 
that efforts should be made to reduce potential barriers to customers self-
identifying themselves as experiencing problems and requiring assistance.  
Research indicates that lack of knowledge of available services is a primary 
barrier in customers seeking assistance (Hodgins & el Guebaly, 2000; 
McMillen et al., 2004; Rockloff & Schofield, 2004).  Further reported barriers 
to seeking assistance include a lack of trust regarding confidentiality, 
uncertainty regarding the processes that will be initiated once the customer 
self-identifies as experiencing gambling difficulties, and potential stigma 
(Hing, Holdsworth, Tiyce & Breen, 2014; Hing, Nuske, & Gainsbury, 2011; 
Rockloff & Schofield, 2004; Scull, Butler, Mutzleburg, 2003).  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that efforts should be concentrated on increasing 
awareness of what assistance is available on request, and assurances of 
confidentiality. 
Part of the reticence of employees in directly approaching a customer who 
has not self-identified is related to concern regarding hostile responses from 
customers who feel that their privacy is being invaded without their consent 
(Hing & Nuske, 2011a; 2011b).  As noted in previous studies, problem 
gamblers in the gambling environment are more likely to demonstrate 
negative emotional states such as anger and frustration (Delfabbro et al., 
2007; Schellinck & Schrans, 2004). The probable negative emotional 
disposition of problem gamblers is likely to make the interaction with the 
customer even more challenging.  Hing and Nuske (2011b) propose that 
attempts should be made to encourage a cultural shift, where gamblers are 
informed that displays of distress or problem gambling behavioural indicators 
will stimulate customer interaction from employees.  They propose a parallel 
is drawn to venue employees’ intervention when customers appear overtly 
intoxicated, where staff intervention is perceived as within their legitimate 
rights and responsibilities, rather than as an unnecessary intrusion.  However, 
it is fully acknowledged that creating support for, and acceptance of, such an 
ethical climate within gambling venues would require a considerable cultural 
shift emanating from significant public awareness campaigns (Hing & Nuske, 
2011b).   
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Cultural shift regarding the role of 
training 
 
“Staff should be better trained. Local and national helplines should be 
known by staff.” 
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“Staff need to be trained and made aware of the seriousness of an 
individual’s request to be excluded. I have heard of a person with dual 
diagnosis being ridiculed when requesting to self-exclude.” 
“Regular, up-to-date training for front line staff – betting shops, casinos – 
in areas concerning self-exclusion.” 
“In general the feedback from those self-excluding has been received well 
by well-trained personnel but this still has room for improvement and more 
understanding.” 
There were isolated examples of very poor customer service reported by 
some treatment organisations, emphasising the importance of good staff 
training and the need for a strong culture of social responsibility within an 
organisation: 
 
“One gentleman relayed how he had gone in to self-exclude himself 
and the cashier didn’t know how to process his request and asked him 
to wait for the manager to come in or come back later. He decided to 
wait, gambled what money he had and left; the same cashier took his 
money and never said a word.” 
“Another experience discussed was that the cashier accepted his self-
exclusion but said not to worry you can still come in and have your 
dinner and you can always change your mind and have a gamble if 
you like.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Staff training an important basis for 
the provision of self-exclusion 
All of the operators agreed with the general principle, with some 
sectors or operations only focussing on staff where this constitutes a 
key part of their job (customer-facing staff, area managers). For 
example, a game designer or an odds compiler in a remote operation 
may not require a detailed knowledge of self-exclusion principles. 
“Training when it comes to responsible gaming at our company is 
split in various levels, and the self-exclusion process is mentioned in 
all the training.  Every customer service agent gets the RG training on 
policies and procedures (thus specifically covering self-exclusion step 
by step) on an annual basis.” 
 
Card-blocking as an adjunct to self-exclusion in some land-based venues 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of any empirical evidence, it was considered 
appropriate to make brief mention of a possible component measure that 
might merit consideration both in terms of operational practice and for further 
research. There may be potential to augment the provision of self-exclusion 
through allowing self-excluders to request blocking the use of debit or credit 
cards in land-based venues (where player identification and detecting 
breaches, particularly outside a ‘local area’, proves to be more difficult).   
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In theory, this may be possible directly through the bank if merchant 
codes, identified as ‘gambling-related’, could be prohibited.   Alternatively, 
this might be feasible by direct agreement with gambling operators. Potential 
benefits of this option could be quick and easy implementation across venues 
at a regional or national level and a reduced chance of a breach; at least for 
that specific payment method). There may also be a number of limitations 
with this approach, the most notable of which, is that gamblers would still be 
able to gamble using cash if they entered the venue undetected.  
A detailed consideration of this component measure and the various 
complexities regarding its merits, limitations and operational issues is beyond 
the scope of this review. However, evidence suggests that problem gamblers 
are more likely seek access to additional funds and make multiple 
withdrawals within a gambling session (McMillen, Marshall & Murphy, 
2004; Productivity Commission, 1999) and for this reason, exploring 
additionall restrictions for self-excluders on ‘in-venue options’ for accessing 
additional funds warrants further examination. 
 
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The theoretical basis for using self-exclusion as a harm minimisation tool 
is relatively unambiguous. Put simply, removing the opportunity to gamble 
from those who struggle with self-control in a gambling-related context will 
help minimise at least some gambling-related harm. However, the most 
efficient approach to implementation and enforcement, and to what extent this 
will reduce gambling-related harm, and who is likely to benefit most, are 
issues which continue to challenge stakeholders. 
From reviewing the literature, effective self-exclusion protocols should: 
 
• be actively but strategically promoted;  
• be quick and simple to implement;  
• be administered by staff  with relevant, up-to-date and regular 
training;  
• attract sufficient investment in resources and technology to improve 
enforcement;  
• have comprehensive (i.e. multi-site, multi-operator) rather than 
isolated coverage where feasible. 
 
However, work is needed to assess the operational feasibility and clinical 
implications of these recommendations, which in turn will yield important 
information regarding optimum strategy for delivery and function. When 
considering investment in different harm minimisation choices, what is most 
important is that those resources aimed at harm minimisation are used 
efficiently. Options which are expensive, difficult to implement and/or 
manage, offer minimal reductions on gambling-related harm and adversely 
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affect the gambling experience (for those not experiencing harm) should be 
identified as inefficient with resources being diverted to more promising harm 
minimisation options. 
Consequently, self-exclusion is a very good idea in principle and likely to 
help reduce gambling-related harm when employed with other strategies: 
however, the real challenge lies in establishing specific principles for efficient 
self-exclusion (e.g., promotion, duration, product focus, degree of flexibility 
etc.,) and making a judgement as to what proportion of spend on harm 
minimisation should be allocated to self-exclusion. 
In addition we draw the reader’s attention to the conclusions drawn in a 
recent broader review of operator-based approaches to harm minimisation 
(see Blaszczynski, Parke, Parke and Rigbye, 2014). Based on this review we 
also suggest that the following will likely be important in facilitating effective 
self-exclusion: 
 
1. The at-risk player should be engaged, wherever possible, before 
significant harm is experienced. 
2. Appropriate responsible gambling intervention training, with clear 
specification of staff responsibilities, should be put in place.  
3. Self-exclusion strategies should be evaluated using robust research 
designs, adequately-sized samples, adequate outcome variables and 
follow-up measures. 
4. Guidelines for self-exclusion should be prescriptive wherever possible 
(e.g., specifications regarding what constitutes a minimum acceptable 
level of ‘active promotion’). While the absence of empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of different approaches current limits the level of 
specificity that can be achieved, working groups involving multiple 
stakeholders should work together to develop principles in the interim 
period until the evidence-base catches up. 
 
5 RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR SELF-EXCLUSION 
 
Based on this review, we believe priorities for identifying best practice in 
self-exclusion relate to practical as well as theoretical examination. Initial 
priorities are suggested below. 
Ongoing assessment of options for Multi-Operator Self-Exclusion 
Schemes 
There is compelling justification for continuing to explore the 
opportunities for connecting self-exclusion across venues and operators. This 
should be a top priority for strengthening self-exclusion and harm 
minimisation more generally. Even among operators responding in the survey, 
an overwhelming majority were supportive of this strategy in principle, 
providing the barriers can be overcome. A detailed consideration of the 
technological, operational and legal issues that will constrain or otherwise 
shape the potential range of solutions is required. In addition, the most 
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appropriate governance arrangements also need to be determined (i.e., 
regulator driven, player driven or operator driven).  
Resolving these issues is likely to require ongoing consultation between 
stakeholders in the first instance, rather than traditional empirical research. 
Part of this feasibility work should include operational trials in relation to 
potential technology solutions to explore potential challenges documented by 
Dragicevic and colleagues. Such trials should involve the participation of 
multiple operators currently serving British citizens in order to test a solution 
over a reasonable timescale. This should allow potential barriers to be 
examined in a systematic and controlled way.  
Player survey on player behaviour and perspectives on self-exclusion 
A key conclusion from this review is that stakeholders require a better 
understanding of the potential costs and impacts of various approaches to the 
promotion and enforcement of self-exclusion in order to facilitate policy-
orientated decision-making. A relatively inexpensive and expedient first 
option would involve a survey seeking player perspectives on the likely 
uptake and impact of more innovative approaches to self-exclusion (e.g., 
disentitlement options, product-specific exclusion) and developing an 
improved understanding of post-exclusion behaviour (including continued 
gambling with other venues, different operators, different products or through 
different channels). This initial research could identify more promising areas 
to pilot some experimental research in order to obtain robust empirical 
evidence regarding costs and impact.  
Trialling optimal approaches for improving detection and preventing 
breaches 
It is also recommended that work identifying and trialling the most 
efficient approaches and technologies in the detection and enforcement of 
self-exclusion in land-based environments is carried out and documented. At 
the time of writing, trials examining the potential impact of facial recognition 
in detection and enforcement in the British gambling industry are under way 
in casinos (e.g., National Casino Forum) and adult entertainment centres (e.g., 
Praecepe). Identifying and exploring options for restricting debit and credit 
card use in land-based venues as a primary or adjunct facility to self-exclude 
may also hold promise. 
Identification of plausible harm 
As part of a broader programme of harm minimisation research, further 
studies should continue to explore the feasibility and accuracy of classifying 
gamblers who may be at risk or experiencing harm. If accurate and reliable 
identification is possible, then the promotion and implementation of self-
exclusion can be more targeted. We recommend that work in this area 
continues to be a priority including strategies such as drawing on observable 
behavioural indicators overtly displayed by individuals, as well as extending 
investigations beyond gaming machines to other forms of gambling.   
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